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Japan’s deteriorating ﬁscal situation has attracted worldwide attention. If
the situation does not improve, the resulting huge public debt is expected
to sharply increase Japanese interest rates, lower Japan’s international
creditworthiness, and adversely aﬀect the welfare of future generations. In
this chapter, I assess what current Japanese government ﬁscal policies
mean for the future of public debt and the economy in general, given the
inevitable aging of the population.
Owing to a very weak domestic economy, which lowered tax revenues
and raised government spending, Japan’s ﬁscal balance has deteriorated
dramatically. The budget, in surplus until 1992, turned negative in 1993,
and the deﬁcits have continued to worsen, reaching almost 11 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP) in 1998. Debt ballooned: The government
debt-GDP ratio increased by almost half from 1991 to 1997 and by another
quarter in the two years after that. By 2000, Japan had the largest ratio
among the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) member countries.
Japan’s ﬁscal situation continues to look grim, especially given the
demographic situation. Population aging is expected to slow economic
growth and raise future government health care and social security expen-
ditures. Projections of the country’s population and the percentage of the
total population that is elderly are plotted in ﬁgure 3.1(Ministry of Health
and Welfare 1998).
3
The Deteriorating Fiscal Situation
and an Aging Population
Robert Dekle
Robert Dekle is associate professor of economics at the University of Southern California.
I thank Magnus Blomström, Jennifer Corbett, Fumio Hayashi, Anil Kashyap, and other
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) conference participants for helpful com-
ments. I also thank Mr. Akira Furukawa for advice on data collection, and Larry Meissner









































sThe population over sixty-ﬁve has grown rapidly and now stands at
about 15 percent. By 2020, its percentage is expected to approach 25 per-
cent, and by 2050, 33 percent. These rates of aging are much higher than
for example in the United States, where only about 15 percent of the pop-
ulation will be over sixty-ﬁve by 2025.
This chapter ﬁrst reviews how Japan got into its current ﬁscal mess dur-
ing the 1990s. This is followed by an analysis of debt dynamics. With un-
changed ﬁscal policies, Japan’s public debt will rise to between 260 percent
and 380 percent of GDP in 2020, and to between 700 percent and 1,300
percent in 2040—clearly unsustainable levels. For the debt to be sustain-
able, signiﬁcant increases in taxes or cuts in government spending are nec-
essary.
Next, the government’s ﬁscal agendas are brieﬂy discussed. The focus
has been on spending cuts rather than tax increases. However, most of the
proposed cuts were postponed or abandoned as the government sought
to stimulate demand in light of the very weak domestic economy. The re-
sults of a simulation exercise that explicitly incorporates the eﬀects of
an aging Japanese population are then presented. In the simulation, I
explicitly model the interplay between government ﬁscal policies and
household and corporate behaviors. This is important, because ﬁscal
policies clearly can aﬀect private behavior, and these changes in private
behavior may, in turn, inﬂuence the dynamics of government debt. The
simulation shows that, absent cuts in government spending, for the gov-
ernment debt to be sustainable, taxes would need to increase from the
current 28 percent of GDP to over 40 percent by 2020. The tax increases
and the inevitable aging of the population are projected to sharply reduce
household saving rates. As the labor force declines and the need to equip
workers with capital decreases, corporate investment rates also are pro-
jected to fall.
3.1 The Current Japanese Fiscal Situation
Government saving declined and public investment rose in the 1990s
(table 3.1). These trends were caused by the recession, as well as by struc-
tural changes. The recession and the decline in the rate of economic
growth lowered tax revenues. Structural changes that worsened govern-
ment saving included tax reforms that lowered tax elasticities and thus tax
revenues, and the aging of the population, which raised social security
and health care expenditures. In the 1990s the government also boosted
public investment in an attempt to stimulate aggregate demand. These
changes in government saving and public investment led to a sharp dete-
rioration in government ﬁnances. The resulting increase in outstanding
bonds has raised concerns about ﬁscal sustainability and calls for ﬁscal
reform.
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Government saving can be divided into full-employment and cyclical
components. In a recessionary environment, government spending usually
increases because of higher unemployment and social welfare beneﬁts.
However, owing to the low cyclical variability of Japanese unemployment
and social welfare beneﬁts, government spending increases in Japan dur-
ing the 1990s recession were capped. Also during recessions, tax revenues
can decline because of lowered incomes. I estimate that during 1990–1999,
Japan’s full-employment government saving was about 2.6 percent of
GDP, compared to an actual level of 2.0 percent, making the cyclical com-
ponent –0.6 percent. Thus, much of the decline in government saving in the
late 1990s was from structural factors, such as tax reductions, rather than
from automatic stabilizers.1
Government saving also can be broken down into the social security sur-
plus, the surplus in other categories, and health care expenditures (table
3.2). The social security surplus (beneﬁts minus contributions) fell from
about 1.3 percent of GDP in the early 1990s to about 0.4 percent in 1999
because of the recession (lowering contributions) and increase in the num-
ber of elderly (raising beneﬁts). Government health care expenditures rose
from about 3.6 percent of GDP in the early 1990s to about 4.3 percent in
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1. I estimate full-employment government saving by regressing government saving on the
output gap and a constant, using quarterly data from 1990 to 1999. I interpret the estimated
value of the constant—which is the government saving rate when the output gap is equal to
zero—as full-employment government saving. The estimated value of the constant equaled
2.6 percent.
Ihori, Nakazato, and Kawade (2002) also show that the acyclical component of govern-
ment saving was small. They ﬁnd that much of the decline in government saving can be at-
tributed to the decline in trend output, rather than to the decline in acyclical output. The low
cyclical variability of government saving is corroborated in an International Monetary Fund
(IMF) study showing that a 1 percentage point increase in the output gap translated into an
increase of the cyclical deﬁcit by about 0.33 percent of GDP, which is about half of the deﬁcit
response in other OECD countries (Muhleisen 2000).
Table 3.1 Japanese Private and Government Saving, Investment, and Net Exports
(% of GDP)
Private Government Private Public Net Export
Saving Savinga Investmentb Investment Surplus
1955–1973 13.5 9.5 17.3 7.3 –1.5
1974–1979 26.3 3.1 20.7 9.2 –0.6
1980–1990 26.0 4.5 20.7 7.4 2.4
1991–1995 26.0 5.2 21.5 7.7 1.9
1996–1999 28.4 1.6 20.3 8.0 1.8
Source: Economic and Social Research Institute (1999, 2001).
aIncludes net social security surplus.
bIncludes plant and equipment, housing, and inventory investment.1999, mainly owing to the increase in the elderly, who use most of the hos-
pital services. However, the health care expenditure-GDP ratio in Japan is
still smaller than in the United States (6.6 percent) and Germany (7.7 per-
cent). The remaining category of government saving includes such items as
education, defense, and policing and ﬁreﬁghting. Saving in this category
declined sharply from 9.5 percent of GDP to 3.9 percent because of the fall
in income and consumption tax revenues.
3.1.2 Public Investment
During the 1990s, the Japanese government passed ten stimulus pack-
ages in an attempt to jump-start the stalled economy. The most important
component of these packages was public works, which are included in
public investment. However, the actual increases in the late 1990s were
rather moderate compared to the prominent and headline grabbing role of
public works in the stimulus packages.
There are two reasons actual public works fell short of announced lev-
els. First, the central government assigned roughly two-thirds of the in-
creased public works spending to local governments without providing a
commensurate increase in funding. The capacity of local governments to
expand public investment was aﬀected by their poor ﬁnancial situation,
and the continued rise in public investment has increasingly been ﬁnanced
through local bond issues. The amount of outstanding local government
bonds increased from 12 percent of GDP in 1990 to 22 percent in 1997.
Many local governments surpassed the legally allowed threshold of bonds
outstanding and were put under bond issuance restrictions by the central
government. Second, some of the public investment funds provided by the
stimulus packages remained unused because of poor project implementa-
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Table 3.2 Overview of Government Finances (% of GDP)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Fiscal balancea 1.9 1.8 0.8 –2.4 –2.8 –4.1 –4.9 –3.7 –10.7 –7.0
Government 
saving 7.2 7.2 6.7 4.7 4.2 2.9 2.6 2.6 1.2 0.0
Social security 
surplus 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.4
Healthcare –3.6 –3.5 –3.7 –3.8 –3.9 –4.1 –4.2 –4.1 –4.2 –4.3
Other surplus 9.5 9.0 8.8 7.1 7.0 5.9 5.6 5.5 4.6 3.9
Gross debt 65.1 64.7 67.6 72.7 78.4 85.4 91.8 97.5 108.5 120.5
Net debt Ab 7.3 6.4 12.3 10.1 12.1 16.9 21.6 27.9 38.0 44.4
Net debt Ba 35.4 35.5 42.9 42.8 46.6 52.5 57.7 64.6 75.9 84.9
Source: Economic and Social Research Institute (2001).
aGovernment saving plus net land purchases and net gift and inheritance taxes minus public investment.
bIncluding social security system assets.
cExcluding social security system assets.tion. Ishii and Wada (1998) calculated that only 60 percent to 70 percent
of the packages’ public works had been translated into additional demand
by the during late 1990s.2
3.1.3 Government Debt and Liabilities
The late 1990s decline in government saving and rise in public invest-
ment led to a surge in government debt, as shown in table 3.2. The ﬁscal
surplus declined almost continuously in the 1990s until reaching about mi-
nus 11 percent in 1998. The 1999 improvement has not carried over in the
2000s. Correspondingly, the ratio of debt to GDP has risen sharply. By in-
ternational standards, Japan’s gross debt-GDP in 1999 was the highest
among the Group of Seven (G7) countries—Italy’s was 115 percent and
the United States’ was 62 percent.
The ﬁscal balance as a percentage of GDP is less than the diﬀerence be-
tween the government saving ratio and the public investment ratio (table
3.1, column [2] minus column [4]) by about two percentage points, mainly
because of the inclusion of net government land purchases in the ﬁscal bal-
ance. During the 1990s, the government bought signiﬁcant amounts of
land from the private sector to prop up land prices.
Because of the partly funded nature of the Japanese pension system, as
well as the government’s major role in ﬁnancial intermediation, the Japan-
ese government holds signiﬁcant assets, keeping net debt-GDP at a mod-
erate level and lower than in other G7 countries. However, the assets of the
social security system are more than oﬀset by future pension obligations.
Therefore, some, including the OECD and the IMF, exclude social security
net assets when assessing Japan’s debt situation. As a result, Japan’s net
debt excluding social security net assets, at 85 percent, is signiﬁcantly
higher than the United States’ 60 percent, and Germany’s 53 percent.
3.2 Projecting the Debt Burden
Table 3.3 depicts the dynamics of the debt-GDP ratio under three sce-
narios about tax, public investment, and spending policies and two as-
sumptions regarding real interest rates. In scenario 1, current policies con-
tinue and the debt dynamics are clearly unsustainable: Even under
optimistic interest rate expectations, debt exceeds 250 percent of GDP by
2015. (I deﬁne “unsustainable” as meaning that the debt-GDP ratio goes
to inﬁnity.) Scenario 2, like scenario 1, assumes government spending and
public investment policies remain unchanged, but also assumes the gov-
ernment suﬃciently raises taxes so that the debt-GDP ratio stabilizes and
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2. Tracking public works budgets in Japan is tricky because so much of the spending is out-
side the regular budget of the central government. Thus, looking just at the general expendi-
tures data there actually were declines each year from ﬁscal 1994 to 1999.Table 3.3 Debt-to-GDP Ratio Dynamics (% of GDP)
Public Government Debt If Debt If
Year Taxes Investment Spending 3%a 6%b
Scenario 1: Unchanged Government Policies
2000 28 8 25 45 45
2005 28 8 26 80 91
2010 28 8 28 127 157
2015 28 8 28 191 257
2020 28 8 26 262 381
2025 28 8 27 337 508
2030 28 8 27 428 715
2035 28 8 33 540 949
2040 28 8 30 690 1263
Scenario 2: Increased Taxes
Public Government Taxes If Debt If Taxes If Debt If
Investment Spending 3%a 3%b 6%b 6%b
2000 8 25 28 45 28 45
2005 8 26 31 81 31 91
2010 8 28 34 111 34 140
2015 8 28 39 141 47 200
2020 8 26 40 149 49 202
2025 8 27 41 141 50 186
2030 8 27 41 134 50 166
2035 8 33 44 130 51 143
2040 8 30 44 129 53 129
Scenario 3: Cuts in Spending and Investment
Public Government Debt If Debt If
TaxesI nvestment Spending 3%a 6%b
2000 28 8 25 45 45
2005 28 3 22 71 81
2010 28 3 24 67 92
2015 28 3 24 72 116
2020 28 3 22 74 145
2025 28 3 23 70 175
2030 28 3 23 69 213
2035 28 3 27 72 264
2040 28 3 25 93 346
aAssuming a 3 percent real interest rate on government debt.
bAssuming a 6 percent real interest rate on government debt.eventually declines. Stabilization with 3 percent interest rates comes
around 2015–2025, at 140 percent to 150 percent, and with 6 percent in-
terest is at just over 200 percent in the 2010s.
As described later, the government is undertaking ﬁscal reform, and is
planning deep cuts in spending and public investment. Scenario 3 assumes
the reforms are carried out. This leads to dramatically improved debt dy-
namics. Still, the debt-GDP ratio continues to grow, albeit signiﬁcantly
more slowly than in scenario 1, as taxes are not suﬃcient to cover the gov-
ernment’s total expenditures (including the interest payments on the out-
standing debt). Note that at 6 percent interest the debt ratio increases
steadily but at 3 percent it is fairly stable during 2005–2035. This is because
at 6 percent interest, debt grows much faster than GDP.
At 3 percent interest rates, spending cuts (scenario 3) produce lower ra-
tios than increased taxes (scenario 2) but, at 6 percent rates, the ratio in sce-
nario 3 is higher by 2030. The remainder of this section more fully explains
the scenarios.
3.2.1 Assumptions
Because unfunded future social security liabilities are already accounted
for in the scenarios, the net ﬁgure of 45 percent is taken as the initial ratio
of debt to GDP. The dynamics of the debt-GDP ratio are highly sensitive
to assumptions regarding the real interest rate and the real GDP growth
rate. Other things being equal, the higher the real interest rate, the higher
the ratio; and, the higher the real GDP growth rate, the lower the ratio.
Consistent with most forecasters’ projections of real GDP growth for the
next twenty years of between 1 percent and 1.5 percent annually (Japan
Center of Economic Research [JCER] 2001), the analysis here assumes an
average of 1.2 percent annually between 2000 and 2040.
There are two real interest rate assumptions. The ﬁrst is 3 percent be-
cause, since the early 1980s, Japanese real interest rates have averaged
about 3 percent and that rate is used in other studies to project the path of
future Japanese government deﬁcits (IMF 2000; Jinno and Kaneko 2000).
However, in the future, the Japanese government may no longer be able to
borrow at such a low rate and may have to borrow at higher international
real rates. Thus, the second assumption is 6 percent, which reﬂects the av-
erage real cost of borrowing in international ﬁnancial markets in the 1990s.
Note that since 2000, the nominal interest rate on ﬁve- to six-year maturity
Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) has been close to 4 percent. Because
inﬂation rates are essentially zero, the real rate on Japanese government
borrowing is now close to 4 percent.
3.2.2 The Scenarios
Scenario 1, the baseline, is that future government policies essentially re-
main unchanged. With regards to tax and public investment policies, the
78 Robert Dekleassumption is that the government keeps the tax-GDP and public invest-
ment-GDP ratios at current (average 1996–1999) levels. With regards to
government spending policies, projections are more complicated, as pop-
ulation aging aﬀects future government social security and health care ex-
penditures. It is assumed that the government keeps age-speciﬁc expendi-
ture patterns for social security, health care, and education constant at
current (average 1996–1999) real levels. That is, if the average sixty-seven-
year old receives ¥190,000 in government health care in 2000, the average
sixty-seven-year old in 2035 will receive the same inﬂation-adjusted
amount. In addition, it is assumed that eligibility for social security re-
mains at sixty, and for old age health care beneﬁts remains at seventy. Other
government spending, mainly defense, policing, and administration, are
assumed to always equal the average 1996–1999 ratio to GDP of 5.6 per-
cent.3
Under these spending assumptions, table 3.4 shows the projections of
total government spending in 1995 yen and as a share of projected GDP.
The shift in the age distribution towards the elderly signiﬁcantly raises gov-
ernment spending. In particular, in 2035 the population over sixty-ﬁve in-
creases signiﬁcantly, leading to a spike in social security and health care
spending. These spending projections (after rounding) are used directly in
scenarios 1 and 2.
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3. For social security, I divided average social security expenditures in 1996–1999 by the
population over age sixty. For health care, I allocate average health care spending in 1996–
1999 to diﬀerent ages, using the age-speciﬁc expenditure patterns reported by in Ishi (2000).
For education, I divide average education spending in 1996–1999 by the population aged ﬁve
to twenty.
Table 3.4 Projected Government Spending, 2000–2040
1995 ¥ Billions % of GDPa
Social Health Social Health
Security Care Education Security Care Education Totalb
2000 57,667 27,271 16,327 10.7 5.3 3.2 24.8
2005 65,265 28,471 15,634 11.9 5.4 2.9 25.8
2010 74,032 29,462 15,445 13.9 5.7 3.1 28.2
2015 78,318 30,550 15,067 14.1 5.7 2.8 28.2
2020 78,903 30,659 14,689 13.2 5.1 2.4 26.3
2025 79,098 30,089 13,680 14.2 5.2 2.3 27.3
2030 79,683 29,392 12,923 14.2 5.2 2.3 27.3
2035 81,630 28,764 12,167 18.3 6.3 2.7 32.9
2040 81,046 28,407 11,915 16.1 5.7 2.4 29.8
aThe GDP projections are from the simulation model in Dekle (2002).
bIncludes 5.6 percent each year for “other spending” (i.e., for defense, policing, administra-
tion, etc.).In scenario 3, in 2015, the age of eligibility for social security is raised to
sixty-ﬁve and for old-age health care beneﬁts, to seventy-ﬁve. Other spend-
ing is reduced by 10 percent in 2005. These changes in social security and
in old-age health care correspond roughly to what are actually included in
the ﬁscal reform agendas. Public investment is cut especially sharply to 3
percent of GDP by 2005—the level prevailing in the United States (Muhl-
eisen 2000).
3.3 The True Size of Government Liabilities
Because of unfunded liabilities, the government’s true net obligations
today may be substantially higher than the reported 45 percent of GDP. In
addition to unfunded social security obligations, there are three main
sources of unfunded liabilities. These are potential losses on government
assets, explicit government guarantees of private sector lending, and im-
plicitly guaranteed private sector loans.
Potential losses on government assets are signiﬁcant. A portion of the
government’s assets represent soft loans that may not be repaid. Many
large public or joint public-private infrastructure projects ﬁnanced from
Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) loans generate less revenue
than budgeted, which may imply signiﬁcant contingent liabilities of the
government. Doi and Hoshi (chapter two of this volume) show that many
public corporations and local governments carrying out infrastructure
projects are essentially insolvent. They estimate the amount of potential
government bailout of the FILP and the local governments as over 15 per-
cent of the 2000 GDP.
The second source of unfunded liabilities is explicit government guaran-
tees of private sector lending. Explicit guarantees are extended by the
FILP and other government entities to encourage lending by private ﬁ-
nancial institutions. Examples are guarantees of bank deposits by the De-
posit Insurance Corporation and of lending by credit cooperatives to
small- and medium-enterprises. Although these do not entail fresh gov-
ernment lending, should the guaranteed loans not be repaid, the govern-
ment must cover them from its budget. The total amount of outstanding
government-guaranteed bonds and loans amounted to about 10 percent of
GDP in 2000. Although historically only about 1 percent of such loans are
never repaid, the percentage could soar if the Japanese economy worsens
(Bayoumi 1998).
In addition to explicit government guarantees, there are implicitly guar-
anteed private sector loans. Historically, the Japanese government has
shown a willingness to make good the irrecoverable loans of private ﬁnan-
cial institutions. In 2000, public funds spent recapitalizing the banking sys-
tem and included in government spending totaled about ¥8 trillion (2 per-
cent of GDP). This willingness represents implicit guarantees, and these
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spite the large amount of public funds already spent, Fukao (chapter one
of this volume) argues that the Japanese government may have to expend
additional funds to recapitalize the private banking system within the next
two or three years. In that case, the cost to taxpayers would be equal to the
estimated losses on problem loans minus the loan loss reserves of the bank-
ing sector. Fukao calculates that this cost to taxpayers would be about 2
percent of GDP (¥7.6 trillion at March 2001).
3.4 Fiscal Reform Measures
To restrain future increases in the government’s debt and in other liabil-
ities, the government proposed several ﬁscal reform measures in the 1990s.
However, most of the measures were postponed or abandoned as the gov-
ernment sought to stimulate demand in light of the very weak domestic
economy. The 1997 Fiscal Structural Reform Law, with its goal of elimi-
nating ﬁscal deﬁcits by 2003, is the most signiﬁcant measure.
The main instruments in the 1997 law were cuts in government con-
sumption and investment, rather than tax increases. Public investment
spending was to be cut by 7 percent in 1998, with zero nominal growth un-
til 2001; and energy, education, and overseas development assistance were
to be cut by 10 percent in 1998, with annual reductions until 2001 (Ishi
2000, 149). However, with the severe recession of 1997, ﬁscal consolidation
was put on hold, and a wide range of pump-priming measures were intro-
duced. In particular, rather than declining, public investment for 1998 was
increased by over 10 percent.
Health care and social security were areas where the 1997 law had an
eﬀect. In 1997, the contribution rate and copayments by patients for gov-
ernment health insurance schemes were increased sharply (Ishi 2000). In
particular, patients aged seventy and above are required to pay a ﬁxed pro-
portion (10 percent) of their medical costs. The government also capped
prescription drug prices, which are very high in Japan.
In 2000, a social security reform bill based on the 1997 law passed the
Diet. The bill contains provisions to cut lifetime beneﬁts by about 20 per-
cent. Speciﬁcally, beneﬁts for new retirees will be cut by 5 percent; begin-
ning in 2013, the age of eligibility will be raised gradually from sixty to sixty-
ﬁve; and beneﬁts will be subject to an earnings test. Analysts have estimated
that these reforms will reduce government unfunded social security liabili-
ties from the current 60 percent of GDP to 30 percent of GDP (IMF 2000).
The government is planning to implement further cuts once the econ-
omy recovers fully. A political commitment has been made to cap govern-
ment deﬁcit bond issues at ¥30 trillion (6 percent) of GDP in 2002. Al-
though deﬁcit bonds reﬂect only a portion of total government borrowing,
this ceiling should help lower future ﬁscal deﬁcits.
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Criticism has been directed at the economic value of public works projects,
as well as contracting procedures. To address the eﬃciency issues, new
cost-beneﬁt guidelines for reviewing projects were announced. Contract-
ing procedures also have been reformed. Public works projects in ﬁscal
2002 (ends March 2003) were scheduled to be cut by 10 percent, although
it is unclear if the cuts will materialize. The government intends to change
the form of public works from traditional construction projects to broader
social infrastructure investment. This includes environmental and energy-
related projects, telecommunications networks, scientiﬁc research, nursing
homes, and the like.
With regards to health care, contribution rates and copayments, espe-
cially by the elderly, are to increase further. The stated goal is to restrict the
growth of medical costs of the elderly to no more than the rate of inﬂation.
In this regard, the Diet has just passed a law to increase the health care co-
payment ratio from 20 percent to 30 percent. The age of eligibility for eld-
erly medical care eventually will also be raised from seventy to seventy-ﬁve.
Further cuts are also planned in social security. There are even suggestions
that average beneﬁts be reduced by another 40 percent to avoid large in-
creases in future contribution rates (Sakurai 1998).
3.5 Interaction with Private Behavior
The calculations of Japanese government debt reported in table 3.3 im-
plicitly assume that private behavior is unaﬀected by government ﬁscal
policies. However, in reality, ﬁscal policies clearly inﬂuence private behav-
ior, and changes in private behavior may, in turn, aﬀect the dynamics of
government debt. For example, government taxation can alter the path of
household saving and corporate investment that, in turn, can change tax
collections. To better project the dynamics of government debt under an
aging population, the interplay between ﬁscal policy and household and
corporate behavior should be accounted for. To this end, I have con-
structed a simulation model.
3.5.1 A Simulation Model
In Dekle (2002), I projected the path of the government budget, together
with the path of private saving and investment in Japan, using a formal dy-
namic economic growth model. Admittedly, the assumptions underlying
the model’s projections are somewhat special, but they are plausible and
provide a fairly rigorous basis for analyzing policy implications.
Speciﬁcally, I closely followed Cutler et al. (1990) in examining the im-
pact of changing demographics on government debt, private investment,
and saving. I simulated the growth model using the future path of demo-
graphics, summarized by the support ratio, which is the ratio of the labor
82 Robert Dekleforce to the total population. The support ratio is projected to fall by 20
percent in the next ﬁfty years.4
In the model, ﬁrms maximize proﬁts using labor, private capital, and
public capital as inputs to produce output (GDP). Firms are blessed with
technical progress that raises the eﬃciency of labor by 1.2 percent a year.
Private capital can be loaned or borrowed at a constant international
rental (real interest) rate of 6 percent.
I show that, if the support ratio is constant, output per capita grows at
1.2 percent per year. A declining support ratio, however, implies output per
capita growth of less than 1.2 percent, as there are fewer workers to sup-
port the population.
Households are assumed to maximize not only their own welfare, but
also the welfare of their children. Preferences are such that households de-
sire to keep consumption per capita growing at a constant rate (consump-
tion smoothing). The model shows that, by borrowing from international
capital markets, households can indeﬁnitely maintain growth in consump-
tion per capita of 1.2 percent. Thus, although consumption per capita
grows at 1.2 percent, output per capita grows at less than 1.2 percent when
the support ratio is declining. Thus, a declining support ratio raises the ra-
tio of consumption to output and lowers the private saving rate.
In the model, the government performs three actions, always taking into
account the eﬀect of these actions on private behavior. First, it supplies
goods and services to households in the form of social security beneﬁts,
health care, and other services. Government expenditures of this form are
assumed to be determined by the age structure of the population, and the
time path of these expenditures is taken as given (from table 3.4).
Second, the government carries out public investment to supply public
capital to ﬁrms. The government is assumed to choose the time path of
public capital optimally, taking into account the oﬀsetting eﬀects of this
public capital on GDP growth and on the public debt burden.
Third, the government levies a tax on households to pay for its spending
and public investment, and this tax imposes eﬃciency losses on house-
holds. Given these eﬃciency losses, the model shows that the government
will choose to levy a tax that is not ﬂuctuating and is growing at the same
1.2 percent annual rate as consumption (tax smoothing). For the govern-
ment to remain solvent, the present value of these taxes must be at least as
large as the current stock of public debt plus the present value of all future
government spending and public investment. That is, if government tax
revenues are insuﬃcient to cover government spending today, then tax rev-
enues must exceed government spending in the future.
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4. That is, LF/POP   ∑64
i 20Ni/∑99
i 1Ni, where Ni is the number of people of age i, LF is the
labor force, and POP is the total population. Dekle (2002) can be downloaded from my web
site: http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/economics/Pages/faculty/fac_pages/web_dekle.htm.3.6 Projections of Government Debt
The path of government debt and of private saving and investment from
2000 to 2040 are presented in table 3.5, using the results of the model. Un-
der tax smoothing, taxes per capita increase at a constant rate, while out-
put per capita grows at a slower rate; thus, the tax-GDP ratio rises over
time. However, the actual tax rate (28 percent of GDP) in the starting year
(2000) is lower than the 33 percent necessitated by tax smoothing and the
requirement that the government be solvent. To satisfy the government’s
solvency constraint, taxes per capita are allowed to increase more rapidly
between 2000 and 2015, and then increases in taxes per capita are
smoothed from 2015 onward. By 2040, tax rates need to increase to almost
50 percent of GDP for the government to recoup its current outstanding
debt, projected future spending (from table 3.4), and projected future
public investment (table 3.5).
Government saving rates rise from about 1 percent to 2 percent of GDP
in 2000 to about 10 percent in 2020, owing to the increased tax receipts.
Government saving rates decline somewhat in 2035 because of increases in
social security and health care spending caused by the spike in the over-
sixty-ﬁve population in 2035. Because of falling public investment and
high government saving, the ﬁscal surplus (government saving minus
public investment) turns positive after 2020, and rises thereafter. Thus, the
decline in the government net debt-GDP ratio is fairly rapid between 2020
and 2040.
Private saving rates are projected to fall a few percentage points until
2010, and then fall rapidly from 2010 to 2040. This pattern is a result of de-
clines in the support ratio and increases in tax rates, which reduces dispos-
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Table 3.5 Projections of Government Debt and of Private Saving and Investment Rates 
(% of GDP)
Support Net Government Government Private Private Government
Year Ratioa Debt Tax Rate Saving Saving Investment Investment
2000 0.63 45 28 1 28 20 8
2005 0.61 88 31 0 28 20 8
2010 0.59 128 38 2 26 19 7
2015 0.57 153 43 6 18 18 7
2020 0.56 155 45 10 15 18 7
2025 0.55 140 45 9 13 17 6
2030 0.54 122 46 10 11 17 6
2035 0.54 102 47 7 12 16 6
2040 0.52 89 49 13 6 16 6
Source: Dekle (2002).
aRatio of labor force to total population, from Japanese government estimates (Ministry of Health and
Welfare 1998).able income. Although consumption per capita grows at a constant 1.2
percent, output per capita grows at a slower rate (as the support ratio de-
clines), thus lowering saving rates. In eﬀect, consumers are seeking to
smooth their consumption when income is growing very slowly by lower-
ing their saving rates.
As the labor force shrinks, the need to equip workers with capital equip-
ment decreases, and both private and public investment rates decline. The
private investment rate declines from 20 percent today to about 16 percent
in 2040; the public investment rate declines from 8 percent today to about
6 percent in 2040.
3.6.1 Comparison with Earlier Projections
Only a few studies have examined the interplay between ﬁscal policy and
private saving and investment in Japan. As in my model, these earlier stud-
ies generally predict worsening government budget deﬁcits unless there is
signiﬁcant ﬁscal reform, and declining saving and investment rates as the
Japanese population ages. These studies start from the premise that the fu-
ture path of Japanese government debt is unsustainable unless there is sig-
niﬁcant ﬁscal reform. Their reform scenarios are shown in table 3.6.
The Economic Planning Agency (1998) study envisages signiﬁcant cuts
in future social security beneﬁts and moderate increases in payroll taxes.
Consequently, government saving rises, while private saving falls sharply as
a result of the population aging. The IMF (2000) study envisages reduc-
tions in social security beneﬁts, sharp cuts in public investment, and in-
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Table 3.6 Earlier Projections of Japanese Government Debt and Saving and
Investment Fiscal Reform Scenarios (% of GDP)
2005 2010 2025 2050
Economic Planning Agency (1998)
Government saving –1.1 n.a. –0.5 0.3
Tax rate 32.6 n.a. 34.5 35.4
Private saving 31.5 n.a. 22.6 15.2
Total investment 32.8 n.a. 25.0 20.2
International Monetary Fund (2000)
Net government debta 62.0 62.0 50.0 30.0
Fiscal balanceb –6.0 2.0 3.0 0.0
Private saving 22.0 23.0 22.0 22.0
Japan Center for Economic Research (2001)
Gross debt 149 163 187 n.a.
Fiscal balance –6.0 –5.0 –2.1 n.a.
Tax rate 46.0 47.3 49.9 n.a.
Note: n.a. = not available.
aGovernment gross debt minus gross assets.
bGovernment saving minus public investment.creases in payroll and consumption taxes. Consequently, ﬁscal balances
improve dramatically and the debt-GDP ratio ﬁrst stabilizes, then plum-
mets. A special feature of the IMF model is that, even when income de-
clines, households do not decumulate their assets; thus, the fall in private
saving is moderated. Finally, the Japan Center for Economic Research
(JCER; 2001) envisages sharp increases in taxes and cuts in public invest-
ment. Consequently, ﬁscal balance improves, although debt-GDP contin-
ues to increase slightly, owing to sluggish GDP growth.
3.7 Conclusion
The prospects for improvements in the Japanese ﬁscal situation are grim
unless the government carries out signiﬁcant ﬁscal reform. For example,
under unchanged spending policies, taxes would need to increase from the
current 28 percent of GDP to over 40 percent by 2020 for the government
to be solvent. Japanese citizens should brace themselves for painful ad-
justments in the near future, in the form of lower public services and higher
taxes.
A resumption of strong growth in real GDP would reduce the need for
spending and tax adjustments. For example, if real interest rates are 3 per-
cent, a real GDP growth rate of slightly in excess of 3 percent can imply
falling debt-GDP ratios. The analysis here has assumed that real growth
averages just 1.2 percent per year form 2000 to 2040. This assumes labor-
augmenting technical progress of about 1.2 percent per year, or total fac-
tor productivity growth (TFP) growth of 2.0 percent per year. A TFP
growth of 2.0 percent is actually an assumption on the high side, as it is
about equal to Japan’s average TFP growth between 1970 and 1990, and
Japan has not been as innovative it was then (Branstetter and Nakamura,
chapter seven of this volume). The dramatic 0.8 percent annual decline in
the labor force caused by the aging of the population is what lowers GDP
growth from 2.0 percent to 1.2 percent.
Thus, one way to increase GDP growth is to raise the labor supply. Ono
and Rebick (chapter eight of this volume) argue for removals of structural
impediments that restrict the movement of labor between ﬁrms and dis-
courage women from participating to a greater extent. Another possibility
that has received scant attention until now is to promote immigration into
Japan. Further studies on the impact of increased foreign immigration on
Japanese growth, saving, and the government debt are of high priority.
An aging population does not necessarily mean that Japan will sink into
international oblivion. Certainly, Japanese policymakers are aware not
only of the problems associated with aging, but also of a slew of proposals
to address the problems, both directly and indirectly, through removing the
other impediments to growth discussed in this volume and elsewhere.
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